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Abstract
This Independent Study examines the relationship between political satire and affective
polarization. Affective polarization is a newly growing form of political polarization
wherein partisans are polarized based on mutual dislike for opposing partisans rather than
ideological disagreements. Political news has been linked to this recent trend in
polarization. Over the past two decades, political scientists have taken an interest in
investigating the impact of political satire programs like The Daily Show and The Colbert
Report through the same lens as traditional political news. These satirical news programs
implement satire, a more complex form of comedy that can require more cognitive
processing and can produce a variety of viewing effects. This projects looks into how
orientation of The Colbert Report and partisanship influences one’s affective response to
viewing a clip from The Colbert Report. Drawing from past research, I establish a dual
moderating hypothesis which predicted that conservatives under the entertainment
orientation and liberals under the information orientation would experience higher
affective polarization. I utilize an experimental research design to test my hypotheses.
Results showed that liberals did not experience different levels of affective polarization
under different orientations, and that conservatives experienced a stronger affective
response under the entertainment orientation.
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Introduction
On December 18th, 2014 Stephen Colbert concluded the final episode of The Colbert
Report and thus ended one of the most influential eras of political satire in United States
history. Between both Colbert and fellow late night Comedy Central host Jon Stewart of The
Daily Show, political satire was revitalized and gained a massive following amongst American
citizens. While many popular successors have followed in the footsteps of Colbert and
Stewart, the duo have remained the most influential mixers of comedy and politics in the
21st century.
Colbert and Stewart format their respective programs in a similar style to TV news
programs; with both featuring the discussion of significant and newsworthy topics, but
presented in a satirical way. This satirical approach to the discussion of politics has existed
in the American media for decades, but never to the success of Colbert and Stewart. The
popularity and influence of The Colbert Report and Daily Show have called into question the
legitimacy of these programs as actual sources of news and not just entertainment programs.
The success of Colbert and Stewart has led to a surge in political satire programs, like Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver, Full Frontal with Samantha Bee, and the new iteration of The
Daily Show with Trevor Noah, which have all achieved great popularity. Political satire has
become a key element in the contemporary relationship between politics and media, and has
provided a new lens through which the masses interact with current political issues, actors
and processes.
If programs like The Colbert Report and Daily Show are to be regarded as news, then
the implications of this classification must be examined in depth. Since the founding days of
the United States, the media and press has served as one of, if not the, most powerful tools
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for creating informed citizens. In the current era, the news media has evolved into a diverse
and often times controversial organ of the modern political sphere. Real news carries with it
real impacts, of which political polarization has emerged as one of the most prominent.
Americans have become increasingly polarized over the past few decades, with this
polarization evolving from being rooted in simple ideological disagreements to becoming
rooted in negative affect for opposing partisans. Scholars have pointed to the increasingly
diverse news media environment as one of the potential influencers of this polarization. This
research project seeks to understand the impact that satirical news, specifically The Colbert
Report, has on affective polarization. More specifically, I examine how an individual’s
orientation of The Colbert Report as news or entertainment in combination with their
partisanship influences their affective reaction.
In my exploration of the influence of exposure to The Colbert Report on affective
polarization, I will, in Chapter 1, consult the established body of research behind political
satire, satirical news, and affective polarization. Scholars have examined a wide array of
elements and effects related to these programs, but have yet to establish a connection
between a viewer’s orientation of satirical news and its impact on affective polarization. In
Chapter 2 I will utilize this body of research to develop my theory and form three hypotheses.
Chapter 3 will outline the methodology I will use in my experimental research design.
Chapter 4 will feature an overview of my collected data and a breakdown of my statistical
analyses. Finally, Chapter 5 will involve a discussion of my results, implications of my
findings, potential explanations, and considerations for future research.
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Chapter 1: Review of the Literature
My independent study is focused on examining the influence of satirical news
programs on affective polarization. Recently, scholars of the press have taken interest in
examining the role of entertainment news programs, labeled as “soft news”, as a
component of the American press and its influence on the American public. In the current
lineup of soft news programs that have been looked at by scholars, political satire news
programs, such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, have gained traction as legitimate
sources of information and as powerful influencers on the American public. Political
satirical new programs, hereby known as satirical news (SN), occupy a unique space in the
media spectrum in that they are often focused on entertainment and humor, but feature
discussion and elaboration on relevant political topics that are mainstays in traditional
hard news.
These programs do not exist purely to be funny, McClennen and Maisel (2014) note
how SN, like The Daily Show, emerged as a response to “the mainstream media’s dumbing
down of politics” in favor of “presenting the public with information that was fun,
intelligent, and committed to encouraging critical thinking”. This school of thought that SN
carries real sociopolitical impact outside of being simply entertaining has gained
considerable momentum over the past two decades. Scholars have examined the various
facets of SN, from their content and presentation (Brewer, 2007; Fox et. al, 2011; Newman,
2010) to their audiences and viewing effects (Hmielowski et. al, 2011; LaMarre et. al, 2009;
Becker, 2014; Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). With scholars taking more note on the real
world effects of SN viewership, I will be investigating them with a similar lens to traditional
hard news.
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Polarization has been a well documented aspect of American politics for the past
three decades, and has begun receiving attention amongst scholars of media. Partisan
media in the United States has not only changed the landscape of the American media
environment but has found to be correlated with increasingly polarized public attitudes,
especially when looking at affective polarization. Compared to the oft-researched
ideological and elite polarization, affective polarization holds that polarization of the public
is based more on mutual dislike rather than ideological differences. While political and
media scholars have frequently examined cable and network hard news as influencers on
affective polarization (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Lau et. al, 2016; Levendusky, 2013), they
have largely ignored the role political comedy and SN have played. SN dual role as a source
of entertainment and information makes it so that these programs are often interpreted
and oriented differently based on the viewer and the context (LeMarre et. al, 2009; Becker
et. al, 2010; Feldman, 2013; Young, 2013) an aspect of the programs that should make
them intriguing targets for examining their effects. Additionally, SN programs rely on
various forms of humor, which have shown to have a wide array of cognitive effects in
media contexts (Polk et. al, 2009; Becker, 2014; Warner et. al, 2015).
The connection between political comedy and affective polarization has, to my
knowledge, not yet been established. Fortunately, there is an extensive body of research on
media effects, affective polarization, political humor, and SN. This literature review will
outline the pre-existing research in the mentioned areas in order to establish a theoretical
framework for connecting SN and affective polarization. First, I will look at the research
into affective polarization, its effects, and its causal mechanisms. Second, I will examine the
research behind the content and presentation of SN and their influence on viewing effects.

Skoroda Page 10
Next will be an examination the the cognitive effects of satire and its role in message
processing and followed by an analysis of SN audiences and their orientation and
perception of political comedy. Finally, I will outline my theoretical framework and
hypotheses

Affective Polarization and Media
The past three decades have seen American politics become increasingly polarized
in numerous ways. Much of the scholarly research on polarization over the past few
decades has focused on polarization along ideological lines and on the elite level. Recently,
however, there has been a surge of attention placed on polarization trends at an affective
level. Partisan divides are being noticed not only through policy but also through the
feelings partisans have for their opposites. A recent survey put out by the Pew Research
Center found that fifteen percent of Democratic and seventeen percent of Republican
respondents were unhappy with the idea of an immediate family member marrying
someone of the opposing party (2014). Compared to survey results from the mid-20th
century, this displeasure is far higher with current Americans than past (Iyengar et. al,
2012). Americans irritation towards partisan opposites has extended to numerous facets of
modern day life. Be it the way Americans conduct their spending habits or choose their
friends or romantic partners, polarization on an affective level has changed the American
social, cultural and political landscapes.
While affective polarization at a mass level is a relatively recent trend in American
politics, its roots date back more than half a century. In 1960, Campbell et. al outlined the
nature of partisan identification and its impact on political attitudes and feelings. Campbell
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et. al note that while ideological identifications are strong influencers on partisan choice,
affect has an equal, if not stronger, effect on partisan bonds (1960). Campbell et al found
that partisanship is strongly correlated with parental partisanship, and that those who
strongly identify with a political party are highly unlikely to break their partisan bond, even
if the party’s ideology changes. These findings, despite not discussing the role of negative
affect, demonstrated the role affect plays in partisanship in 1956, a trend that has
continually grown over the subsequent decades.
Based off Campbell et. al’s findings, political scientists have emphasized the role
affect plays in not only partisan identification, but on the actions and attitudes towards
partisan opposites. From these explorations, researchers have isolated the importance of
social identity, social distance, and tribalism in determining modern partisan attitudes
(Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2014; Mason, 2013; Iyengar et al, 2012). The
blending of one’s political identity and social identity has dramatically increased in the past
two decades, resulting in an electorate that has shown to be aggressively hostile against
itself despite holding similar ideological positions on issues (Mason, 2014; Mason, 2013).
There is, however, disagreement over the role of ideology in explaining affective
polarization (Webster and Abramowitz, 2017; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016). In the
context of evaluations of candidates and officeholders, Rogowski and Sutherland argue that
“Citizens form affective evaluations on the basis of their ideological positions” (2016: 504).
Further, Webster and Abramowitz show evidence of affective polarization spurned through
polarized ideological thinking in the realm of social welfare. These disagreements over the
nature of affective polarization suggest that within specific areas of politics, such as social
welfare policy, ideology can play a major role in explaining polarized attitudes and feelings.
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Nonetheless, there is great amount of evidence and support for affect as an explanation for
mass polarization, especially within the press.
Partisan media outlines have grown rapidly over the past two decades, and have
subsequently taken ahold of American cable news. This rise in popularity of these partisan
news programs has accompanied the rise of political polarization, causing scholars to look
more closely at the effects of and motivations for watching partisan media.
In the subsequent examinations of affective polarization, scholars have repeatedly
pointed to increasingly diverse and partisan media environment as a casual mechanism
(Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Lau et. al, 2016; Levendusky, 2013). Media consumers now have
more choice than ever as to how and from whom they are able to receive information. This
phenomenon of selective exposure has been well documented among scholars (Lau et. al,
2016; Iyengar et. al, 2012; Stroud, 2010) with heavy emphasis being placed on how
viewing politically like minded media outlets influences polarization (Levedusky, 2013).
Unsurprisingly, partisan media is most watched by like-minded viewers on both
sides of the spectrum. In looking at the effects of partisan media, Levendusky found that
viewing like-minded media reinforced attitudes and resulted in the viewer becoming more
extreme, with these effects lasting several days (2013). Reinforcing one’s political beliefs
provides validation for their worldview, thus causing them to more strongly hold onto their
beliefs. It is worth noting, however, that these effects are not significantly present amongst
moderate viewers of partisan media. Nonetheless, the ability for partisans to engage in
selective exposure has allowed them to exclusively view content that supports their
worldview and, oftentimes, attacks their opponents, thus helping to facilitate affective
polarization.
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Building off the research that has focused on the effects of viewing like-minded
partisan media, scholars have looked at the effects of viewing opposite-minded partisan
media and have found just as interesting results. Exposure to information that contradicts
or directly attacks one’s worldview and beliefs has shown to potentially create a response
within the viewer that causes them to latch on to their beliefs even more. This phenomena,
known as “The Backfire Effect”, is still questioned amongst scholars, but has contributed to
the overall body of research behind the challenging of personal opinions (Nyhan and
Reifler, 2010). The effects of viewing opposite-minded media, sometimes referred to as
crosscutting media, are not as strong or pronounced as the effects of viewing like-minded
media (Levendusky, 2013). This lack of impact stems mostly from the findings that
exposure to crosscutting media leads to viewers disregarding any information that
challenges their worldview and subsequently discounting the source of this challenging
information.

Political Satire
For centuries, comedy has played an important role in the relationship between the
political and public spheres. Comedy has taken numerous forms in democracies as a
mechanism through which the public can interact with, mock, comment on, and learn about
political processes. As Polk et al. state, humor has a storied history as a mean “for
persuasion, to make stories more captivating, sources more likeable, or arguments more
effective” (203). As one of the primary modern purveyors of political comedy, SN programs
have used humor as a powerful tool to inform their discussions of political topics. Research
into SN has often focused on the role various forms of humor can play in presenting
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information in a satirical way, and the effects these various forms of humor have on
viewers.
Humor types vary based on numerous factors, such as complexity, subtlety, context,
and presentation style (Polk et. al, 2009). Humor can manifest itself in many forms in SN,
the most prevalent and obvious of which is through satire. Caufield notes how modern
political satire distinguishes itself amongst other forms of modern political humor stating
that “conventional political humor is often geared at making the audience laugh at others,
while satire is designed to make the audience laugh at itself as well as others” (Caufield,
2008: 10). The recent relevance of SN programs has led to scholarly focus being placed on
examining on how these programs integrate varying forms of satire to present political
information.
In looking at the properties of political satire, scholars have noted how variations in
humor type and complexity can result in different interpretations of topics in which the
humor is related (Becker and Haller, 2014; Becker, 2012; Polk et. al, 2009; LaMarre et. al,
2009). Polk et. al’s examination of SN isolated two forms of satire, sarcasm and irony,
present in SN to study the variation of effects based on humor complexity. Viewers who
were exposed to irony rated the humor as being more complex and had more difficulty
developing counter-arguments as compared to viewers who were exposed to sarcasm
(Polk et. al, 2009). Exposure to different humor types in SN can therefore result in a variety
of cognitive effects that can influence not only the perception of the presented content, but
also the extent to which the content impacts the viewer’s personal belief system.
Perceptions of satire are further differentiated by the means through which the
satire is presented. A prominent example of the variation in satire presentation is the
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direction of satirical humor. Self-directed and other-directed hostile humor are both
frequently present in SN programs, and have each shown to produce vastly different
reaction amongst viewers (Becker and Haller, 2014; Becker, 2012). When humor is selfdirected it is consequently appreciated more by viewers, and the self-director of the humor
is perceived more favorably. Other-directed hostile humor, however, is appreciated much
less by viewers, with the target of the other-directed humor not experiencing significant
unfavorable evaluations (Becker and Haller, 2014; Becker, 2012).
Looking more specifically at the incorporation of unique forms of satire in SN
programs, more wide reaching effects of satire can be observed. Satire has the ability to
make it so that the information presented during the programs can appear as ambiguous
and, therefore, can be interpreted differently (LaMarre et. al, 2009; Becker, 2012). Stephen
Colbert’s The Colbert Report provided one of the best examples of examining ambiguous
messages in political humor. On The Colbert Report, Colbert portrays himself as
exaggerated parody version of a right wing pundit who relies heavily on utilizing a unique
style of deadpan satire. This ambiguity was noted by LaMarre et al. (2009) as eliciting
varied interpretation of Colbert by viewers based on ideology. Ideological conservative
viewed Colbert as being a conservative making fun of liberals, whereas ideological liberal
viewed Colbert as being liberal and making fun of conservatives.
Colbert’s style of presentation appealed to both conservative and liberal viewers, a
phenomenon that has not been noted in other SN programs. LaMarre et al pointed to the
importance of biased information processing in influencing these results (2009: 214). To
viewers, Colbert’s intentions, besides being entertaining, are ambiguous. This ambiguity
resulted in a confirmation bias effect taking place wherein ambiguous information is
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processed by the receiver in a way that favors their own beliefs (2009). Furthermore, the
satire in The Colbert Report could be regarded as both self-directed and other-directed and
was thus able to elicit added mixed effects.
The interpretation of extreme forms of satire, such as with the case of Colbert,
requires more judgment and information processing based on prior knowledge than
traditional forms of political humor (Grey et. al, 2009; LaMarre et. al, 2009; Caufield, 2008).
Satire is oftentimes a critique as much as it is a form of entertainment. As a result, the
presence of humor in satire can be interpreted differently based on not only the recipient
of the satire but the target and source of the satire as well.
This divisiveness in the interpretation of satire has put this distinctive form of
comedy in the spotlight of the media viewing public. Satire forces its audience to pay
attention, and, subsequently, influences their perception. McClennen and Maisel identify
this ability to effect public opinion as being the result of “heightened distrust in
mainstream news media, pervasive public exposure to professional satirical comedy, and
the interaction between professional and citizen-satire” (McClennen and Maisel, 2014: 11).
Satire’s increasing influence on the public has inspired both appreciation and concern
amongst scholars of media and public opinion (McClennen and Maisel, 2014; Dagnes, 2012;
LaMarre et. al, 2009). Like LaMarre et. al demonstrated with The Colbert Report, satire can
lead to misinterpretations of the sincerity and meaning of messages. The inherent
entertaining value of satire has also made it so that messages presented in a satirical way
can be disregarded (Brewer and Cao, 2008; Prior, 2005). Nonetheless, Satire provides an
alternative to the straightforward style of traditional news, and sheds new light on pressing
issues in a more entertaining way.

Skoroda Page 17
News or Entertainment?
Among the most heavily studied aspect of SN programs is the role they play as a
legitimate source of news and information in the increasingly diverse media environment.
The classification of SN programs as soft has given the impression of these programs being
primarily oriented as entertaining and as not having much informative substance. In
contrast to this soft classification, there has been a trend towards examining effects of SN
that extend beyond just being entertaining. In order to understand the role of SN as an
informative source, researchers have looked at and compared the information that SN
sources present to the information in mainstream news broadcasts (Fox et. al, 2011;
Brewer, 2007). In these examinations, it has been found that the majority of news stories
on SN programs, specifically The Daily Show, are political (Brewer, 2007), and that content
on The Daily Show is equally as substantive as content on network news (Fox et al, 2011).
The content of SN, much like traditional news, can vary widely based on current events and
context, but largely remains in a political context.
In addition to the substance of SN programs, researchers have also looked at the
way in which the presentation style of these programs influences their role as an
informative source. Since SN are not bound by traditional journalistic practices and
formats, the content presentation on these shows can vary wildly. One trend that has been
focused on has been the way that SN utilizes “meta-coverage” to report on current events.
Compared to a straightforward reporting style of a standard news broadcast where
information is presented based on the events that occur, meta-coverage involves “the
coverage of the media coverage” in addition to reporting on the events themselves
(Newman, 2010; Esser and D’Angelo, 2003). This technique of reporting allows the
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audience of SN programs to observe the various ways events are discussed across the
media spectrum, and as Newman suggests “may be able to bring political manipulation and
media compliance to the forefront of public discourse” (Newman, 2010: 13).
The popularity and impact of SN programs doesn’t stem simply from the content
and presentation of their respective programs, although both play influential roles.
Research has noted that what made The Daily Show and Colbert Report so popular is the
way in which these programs interact with their audiences. Colbert, especially, gained
traction through his campaigns and initiatives that encourage viewer interaction as a
member of the “Colbert Nation”. Media scholar Sam Ford observed that “these initiatives
demonstrate a type of activism similar to grassroots political campaigns, but operating
through the elements and aesthetics of online fandom” (Ford, 2010: 81). Ford also notes
how the programs exist outside the mainstream media, and how this facet combined with
the audience outreach has created a cult-TV-like fanbase around the programs. (Ford,
2010). Having such dedicated and active fanbases has allowed The Colbert Report and Daily
Show to become not only a news and entertainment experience, but a social experience as
well.
As a result of having such a distinctive style of presentation and audience
interaction in combination with relevant and substantive political content, SN programs
have shown to have a wide array of effects on their audiences based on various unique
components of the programs. For instance, during campaign season, US citizens turn to a
variety of sources in order to make evaluations on candidates. As purveyors of political
information, SN programs frequently feature coverage of campaigns and do so in a manner
that breaks the mold from traditional news programs.
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In looking at how political comedy influenced viewers during campaign season,
Parkin found that Candidate appearances on late night comedy shows, like The Tonight
Show or The Late Show, led to politically disinterested viewers becoming more interested
and engaged in politics (Parkin, 2010). However, these positive effects didn’t carry over to
SN shows that feature discussions of political candidates. Baumgartner and Morris
discovered that any coverage or featuring of political candidates, regardless of party, on
The Daily Show led to more negative evaluations of said candidates and increased overall
political cynicism (Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). These contrasting results suggest two
outcomes. First, political candidate appearances and discussion in programs that employ
political comedy do not have a standard effect on viewers. Second, that there is a difference
in effects between SN shows and late night comedy talk shows that infrequently discuss
politics.
While research has, without question, demonstrated that SN programs do produce
effects on their audience, there is still debate over the extent of these effects and to what
extent they influence their audiences. Amongst youth viewers, the key demographic for SN,
researchers have examined how these programs can serve as a gateway tool for teaching
and engaging youths in politics. In the context of an introductory level US/National Politics
course, Beavers looks at the potential of using political comedy to teach youths about
politics and found that a majority of students reported being more interested in politics as
a result of exposure to The Daily Show and The Colbert Report (2011). As previously
mentioned, however, Baumgartner and Morris posited that viewership of The Daily Show
during election season resulted in increased cynicism towards political institutions and
leaders and lowered political interest amongst already youth viewers (Baumgartner and
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Morris, 2006). These contrasting findings imply that SN effects on political interest can be
conditional on the content and context of exposure. Whereas both research designs
involved exposing students in an introductory US/National political science course to
political satire, the content and context of the clips shown were different. Unlike Beavers,
who exposed participants to a variety of clips, Baumgartner and Morris only showed clips
featuring discussions of presidential candidates in generally negative contexts.
In addition to judging satirical news’ impact on political interest, research has also
examined their role in facilitating learning. Seeing as SN programs do contain substantive
content and factual discussion of relevant political issues, researchers have looked at how
viewership of SN impact learning in comparison to traditional news. Baum posited that SN
allows politically inattentive viewers, who would not otherwise view traditional news, to
better engage with and learn about complex issues (Baum, 2003). Based off of Baum’s
findings, researchers have subsequently examined SN’ impact on learning in the framework
of specific, and often contentious, issue areas. For instance, Stephen Colbert’s Super PAC
segment on The Colbert Report is one of the most examined examples of how SN exposure
can aid in issue knowledge, and opinion formation (Hardy et. al, 2014; Warner et. al, 2015).
Warner et. al demonstrated that exposure to the Colbert Super PAC increased short term
issue recall more than traditional hard news and was influential in priming viewers for
further exposure to campaign finance issues (Warner et. al, 2015). Further, Hardy et. al
found that not only did Colbert increase viewers perception of knowledge about super
PAC’s and 501(c)(4) groups, but increased their actual knowledge as well (Hardy et. al,
2014).
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It is clear from the body of research that it is unreasonable to ignore the impact that
SN has had on politics, media and the public. SN programs offer a new and entertaining way
for which important political information can be presented to the public without sacrificing
important details. These programs have shown an ability to not only influence how viewers
learn about political issues and topics, but also how they process and feel about them.

Satirical News Audiences
Why is it that audiences have been progressively turning their attention more
towards SN programs and political comedy for their news rather than traditional
mainstream news programs? A handful of researchers have focused on this question over
the past decade, and have subsequently made progress in understanding the evolving
media habits of the American public. As previously mentioned, the increasingly diverse
media environment has resulted in new classifications for media types, of which the
distinguishing between soft and hard news emerged. This diverse environment has give the
public the ability to choose between entertaining and informative media, and has thus
altered the ways in which the public interacts with and learns about political processes,
issues and actions through media outlets.
In probing the effects of media choice, Prior (2005) posited that content preference
is a strong predictor of political knowledge and turnout as media choice increases and
found that those with a preference for entertainment, once they gain access to new media,
became less knowledgeable about politics and were less likely to vote. As purveyors of both
entertainment and information, SN programs can be oriented in various ways by their
audiences. Feldman examined how the orientation of SN impacts a viewers motivated

Skoroda Page 22
processing of the information presented, and established that the orienting of The Daily
Show as news, or as a mixture of news and entertainment, resulted in an increase in the
amount of invested mental effort (AIME) that subsequently led to these viewers learning
more. The orientation of The Daily Show as purely entertainment, however, resulted in low
AIME and little to no learning. Additionally, Feldman found that viewers who were directed
to orient The Daily Show as either News or Entertainment, demonstrated the same viewing
effects to those who viewed the program under their inherent orientation (2013).
Looking more specifically at how a preference for SN exposure is formed, scholars
have noted the factors that influence a viewer’s penchant for orienting the programs as
entertaining or informative, and have developed scales to measure this preference in order
to predict future exposure. Young isolated a variety of youth motivations for watching SN,
such as for fun and entertainment, for learning, to make news fun, and for context and
background on relevant issues and events. While these results confirmed previous beliefs
that youths were drawn to The Daily Show and Colbert Report because the programs are
humorous and informative, they also shed new light on the youth perception of these
programs as legitimate, honest, and trustworthy sources of news.
Of all the motivating factors people have for viewing SN programs, the one that is
most consistent across viewing groups is, unsurprisingly, humor and entertainment
(Young, 2013; Beavers; 2011; Hmielowski et, al, 2011; LaMarre et. al, 2009). Across the
media spectrum, humor provides a sort of cognitive reward for viewers, engaging viewers
and attracting new ones. However, political satire, as previously discussed, is a unique form
of humor in it’s own that can be interpreted and enjoyed in vastly different ways. In order
to predict the consumption of satire, Hmielowski et al developed the affinity for political
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humor (AFPH) scale, which, drawing on past research, identified four dimensions of one’s
AFPH: “(1) pointing out or highlighting incongruent information (2) humor contributing to
a sense of superiority (3) the use of humor to relieve stress or anxiety, and (4) the ability of
humor to facilitate interpersonal relationships” (2011: 101). Hmielowski et al’s results
from testing the AFPH demonstrated the scale as being a strong predictor of exposure to
SN, and established social factors as being influential moderators for viewership.
When looking at the motivations one has for watching a program, it’s also important
to consider the reasons one would for avoiding said program. In addition to identifying
motivation factors, Young also demonstrated a drawback of SN programs as being that they
avoided by people low in political knowledge who have trouble understanding the content
and interpreting the satire (2013). Perceived bias has additionally shown to be another
strong indicator of SN avoidance. When bias is perceived in a news program, the content is
often disregarded and given less credibility. In an analysis of cable news viewership, it was
found that perceptions of bias were consistent along partisan lines, with both conservatives
and liberals rating news programs that challenged their views as being biased.
Interestingly enough, The Daily Show was rated by both sides of the political spectrum as
being more biased than Fox News and CNN. Coe et. al suggested that this finding was
reflective of the viewer expectation for SN programs to contain less neutrality in the
discussion of political matters (2008).
The body of research on audience perceptions of, and motivation for watching SN
validates the uniqueness of these programs within the broad media spectrum. SN provides
various avenues through which audiences can learn, laugh, and/or think differently about
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political issues and processes. The ability for audiences to decide how to justify and orient
their viewership of SN makes these programs an extremely enticing subject for research.

Skoroda Page 25
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
This literature review has examined the effects of satirical news viewership, the
utilization and complexities of satire, the orientation and perception of satirical news, and
the role of media in facilitating affective polarization. Despite a great depth of research into
satirical news and media effects, there has not yet been an attempt to establish a
connection between satirical news viewership and affective polarization. My research
project will contribute to the overall body of research by asking: How does orientated
viewership of The Colbert Report influence affective polarization?
SN programs can be perceived in various ways due to their use of satire, which
requires the use of more mental effort, in combination with their substantive and timely
political content. Like traditional news shows, SN programs can be used as sources for
information by some viewers, but other viewers may have different goals and motivation
for SN exposure, which subsequently influences viewing effects.
Feldman demonstrated the difference in viewing effects and AIME in SN based on
viewer orientation of the programs as news, entertainment or a mix of both; and that these
orientations can be predicted based on partisan affiliation. Additional research has pointed
out further factors that help to predict and explain satirical news exposure and orientation,
such as the Hmielowski et al’s Affinity for Political Humor Scale and Young’s isolation of SN
viewing motivations amongst youths. Seeing as this research is interested in affective
polarization, it’s important to take broad partisan media habits into account. Conservative
media viewers have demonstrated to have low trust in most media bodies, and thus
typically refrain from receiving news from a variety of sources. Liberals display the
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opposite habits, trusting in more media sources and thus consuming more. Using these
findings on SN exposure and partisan media habits, I form my first hypotheses:
H1: Ideologically liberal viewers of satirical news will be more likely than
conservatives to orient The Colbert Report as informative and as more credible preexposure
H1a: Ideologically liberal and young (18-25 y/o) viewers will be more likely than
conservatives and older viewers to orient The Colbert Report as informative and as
more credible pre-exposure
The orientation of a program pre-exposure is expected to influence a viewers AIME and
motivated processing when watching a satirical news programs. However, the content of
the program itself has shown to be just as influential on the viewing effects of SN programs,
especially based on the partisanship of the viewer. LaMarre et. al found that partisan
affiliation influenced how The Colbert Report was interpreted by viewers. As mentioned
previously, The Colbert Report utilizes a unique form of satire that makes the content and
presentation of information more ambiguous to viewers. Both liberals and conservatives
viewed Colbert as supporting their respective ideologies despite Colbert’s intentions of
mocking right-wing pundits. LaMarre et al noted that participants were not directed to
watch The Colbert Report with any entertainment or information learning goal, but that
most participants presumably watched the clip for entertainment purposes. Despite
Colbert’s ambiguous satire requiring more AIME in order to understand his intentions,
both conservative and liberal participants found him to be funny and entertaining.
By viewing Colbert as supporting their respective ideologies in an entertainment or
information-oriented mindset, it can be hypothesized that conservatives and liberals will
experience similar effects attune to those of like-minded media exposure. The literature on
affective polarization and media habits demonstrates that viewing like minded partisan
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media can produce negative affect amongst viewers (Levendusky, 2013). Iyengar et al also
demonstrated that viewing media which negatively portrays opposing partisans, in the
case of their study this media was negative campaign ads, resulted in a negative affective
response (2012). Furthermore, Colbert often uses meta-coverage in his segments to
provide context on ongoing partisan debates. This meta-coverage draws from partisan
news channels like Fox News or MSNBC, to provide insight on how either conservatives or
liberal pundits are discussing oftentimes controversial political topics. The use of these
clips may in fact add onto a viewers experiencing of like-minded media effects if the clips
are presented without Colbert explicitly contradicting their content.
Colbert’s persona on The Colbert Report is interpreted, based on partisanship, as
either a support or mockery of right wing pundits and conservative ideologies. Drawing
from my previous hypotheses, Feldman’s findings on how orientated viewing affects AIME,
and LaMarre’s findings on biased partisan processing of The Colbert Report, I expect both
partisanship and viewer orientation of SN to play a dual moderating role in influencing
satirical news exposure and affective polarization.
The inaccurate interpretation of Colbert as a genuine conservative, in combination
with the use of meta-coverage, and a low amount of AIME will result in Conservatives
experiencing like-minded media viewing effects and consequently experiencing negative
affect. Thus, my conservative exposure hypothesis is:
H2: Conservatives who view The Colbert Report under entertainment-orientation will
experience increased affective polarization
On the other side, I hypothesized that Liberal viewers would be more likely to orient the
program as news and as informative. Therefore, Liberal viewers will have a higher AIME
and take Colbert’s satire of right wing pundits more seriously. By investing more mental
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effort and subsequently understanding Colbert’s satire, liberal viewers will experience likeminded media effects and become more affectively polarized. Thus, my liberal exposure
hypothesis is:
H3: Liberals who view The Colbert Report under information-orientation will
experience increased affective polarization
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This Independent Study examines how oriented viewership of The Colbert Report
influences affective polarization. The main independent variable in this study is exposure
to The Colbert Report (TCR), which utilizes complex and ambiguous satire that causes
partisans to engage in a form of motivated processing wherein they interpret Colbert as
supporting their respective ideologies. The main dependent variable in this study is
affective polarization which is defined as polarization rooted in mutual dislike and hatred
of opposing partisans rather than ideological disagreements. There are two moderating
variables in this study, the first of which is partisanship and the second of which is
orientated viewership. Feldman found that SN programs can be oriented as news,
entertainment, or a mixture of both, and that the way SN is orientated impacts the effects of
the program.

Table 3.1- Variables H2/H3
Independent Variable

• Exposure to TCR

Moderating Variables

•
•

Partisanship
Orientation of TCR

Dependent Variable

•

Affective Polarization

Based on the bodies of research behind my variables, I have developed three
hypotheses to predict the orientation of The Colbert Report and the extent of individuallevel affective polarization amongst liberals and conservatives based on orientation of The
Colbert Report. My hypotheses are as followed:
H1: Ideologically liberal viewers of satirical news will be more likely than conservatives to
orient The Colbert Report as informative and as more credible pre-exposure
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H1a: Ideologically liberal and young (18-25 y/o) viewers will be more likely than
conservatives and older viewers to orient The Colbert Report as informative and as more
credible pre-exposure
H2: Conservatives who view The Colbert Report under entertainment-orientation will
experience increased affective polarization
H3: Liberals who view The Colbert Report under information-orientation will experience
increased affective polarization
Table 3.2: Hypotheses H2/H3

Conservative Viewer
EntertainmentOrientation
InformationOrientation

Liberal Viewer

Increased Affective
Polarization

Little to No Affective
Response

Little to No Affective
Response

Increased Affective
Polarization

Experimental Design
In order to test these hypotheses, this study will implement an experimental
research design. When studying media effects and public behavior, such as with my
Independent Study, experimental research designs provide one of the best methods to
obtain results. Compared to other research designs, Experimental designs have high
internal validity, meaning that cause and effect can better be isolated (McDermott, 2002;
Druckman et. al, 2006). In in the case of my independent study, I am looking to isolate how
orientated viewership of The Colbert Report causes an affective polarization effect.
Experimental designs also allow for systemic modifications and control of conditions and
variables, permitting the research conductor to better tailor their design to their research
(McDermott, 2002). Further, experimental designs are repeatable, allowing for results to be
retried under different external conditions in order to verify or challenge results
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(Druckman, 2006). Experimental designs are therefore the best means to draw causal
conclusions and, as a result, have been relied upon for much of the previous research into
Satirical News (Feldman, 2013; LaMarre et. al, 2009; Baumgartner and Morris, 2006)
Despite having a great deal of advantages, experimental designs do have drawbacks
that are worth noting. First, experimental designs have low external validity, meaning that
results cannot be generalized to a larger population. Experimental designs must therefore
include an as diverse as possible test group in order to have more conclusive results.
Second, experimental designs can create artificial environments that may interfere with
results (McDermott, 2002; Druckman, 2006). Exposure to TCR in my design differs greatly
from standard exposure to TCR, creating a synthetic viewing experience. Additionally,
while experimental designs allow for a great amount of control of variables within the
study they do not allow for the control of external variables (McDermott, 2002). For my
online survey I will not be able to account for the setting, mood, health and other external
factors that may influence the results from individual participants. In order to address this
issue, my design will draw from a large sample to eliminate the impact that external
variables may have on an individual participant.
Independent Variable
In order to study the impact of SN orientation on affective polarization, participants
in my research design must be exposed to a SN program, specifically The Colbert Report. As
previously discussed, TCR employs a unique and extreme form of satire that makes
Colbert’s messages more ambiguous to partisans. This study operationalizes ambiguous
satire through exposing participants to a three-minute clip from TCR. The clip I have
chosen for exposure involves Colbert’s incorporating his ambiguous satire into a
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commentary about the partisan debate on Presidential vacations (comedycentral.com,
2014) Colbert draws upon segments from Fox News programs to contextualize the debate,
but never directly contradicts or attacks the information presented by the right wing
pundits. Further, the controversy presented in this clip deals strictly with President Barack
Obama, whom Colbert mocks for “slacking off on destroying America”. The overall tone of
the clip fits within TCR’s style of ambiguous satire that was observed by LaMarre et al as
being interpreted by partisans as promoting their respective ideologies.

Moderating Variables
Prior to their exposure to the Colbert clip, participants will be asked to identify their
partisanship and ideology along a seven-point scale. The moderating variable of
partisanship is not manipulated in this experiment and is operationalized based on how
participants self-identify. My other moderating variable, Orientation of TCR, is both
measured and manipulated in this study. In the pre-test survey, participants will be asked
how they orient TCR based on a five-point scale ranging from “Strictly News” to “Strictly
Entertainment”. After reporting their orientations, participants will be randomly assigned
to one of three pre-exposure directives that serve to manipulate their viewing of the clip.
These directives borrow from Feldman’s methodology that sought to understand how SN
orientation impacted learning and AIME (2013). The variable is further manipulated by
directing participants to prepare to be questioned regarding a specific orientation-related
aspect of the clip (in this case either knowledge or enjoyment).
The three directives are as follows:
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Table 3.3- Pre-Exposure Directives
Entertainment Directive

“Please watch this entertaining clip from The Colbert Report,
be prepared to evaluate Colbert’s performance after the clip”

News Directive

“Please watch this informative clip from The Colbert Report,
be prepared to take a knowledge test after the clip”

No Directive

“Please watch this clip from The Colbert Report”

Following exposure to the clip under the orientation-directives participants will be
asked to answer questions about the content of the program and to evaluate Colbert as a
presenter. These questions seek to gauge the effectiveness of the pre-exposure directives
on learning from and enjoyment of the clip in order to understand the impact on AIME and
the dependent variable. The post test questions are as followed:
Table 3.4- Knowledge Test
1. Where was the Obama vacationing
when he asked an ambassador to
have a dinner party?

1.
2.
3.
4.

Key West
London
Rome
Beijing

2. What event does Fox News critique
Obama for ignoring while on
Vacation?

1.
2.
3.
4.

Tax Bill Vote
Supreme Court Ruling
US/Mexico Border Dispute
International Leader Summit in
Europe

Table 3.5: Entertainment Evaluation
1. Please rate how entertaining you
found the clip to be

1. Very Entertaining
2. Mildly Entertaining
3. Neither Entertaining or
Unentertaining
4. Not very entertaining
5. Not entertaining at all
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2. Please rate how funny you found
Stephen Colbert to be

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Funny
Mildly Funny
Neither Funny or Unfunny
Not very Funny
Not Funny at all

Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable in this study—Affective Polarization—is measured in two
categories, favorability and social distance, based on Iyengar et. al’s operationalization’s
(2012). Favorability is operationalized through three “feeling thermometers” on President
Obama (“How do you feel about the actions of President Obama?”) The Fox News Hosts
featured in the Clip (“How do you feel about the critique from Fox News Hosts?”), and
Colbert himself (“How do you feel about Colbert’s coverage of this debate?”). Each feeling
thermometer will involve participants rating their feeling towards the three subjects on a
1-100 scale. Social distance is operationalized by asking participants to report their
attitudes towards partisan related social situations. The social distance measures are as
follows:
Table 3.6- Social Distance
1. I would be comfortable with my child
or a close family member marrying
someone from an opposing political
party?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Comfortable
Comfortable
Neither Comfortable nor Uncomfortable
Uncomfortable
Very Uncomfortable

2. When establishing friendships, I take
into account the partisanship of
potential friends

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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Controls
In order to control for outside factors that may impact my results, I asked a series of
control questions. These questions borrow from LaMarre et. al’s measures which ask about
participants Age, Race, Gender, Home State, Income, Education, and their past exposure to
The Colbert Report. The operationalization’s of these measures are as follows:
Table 3.7- Controls
What is your Race?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

White
Black
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawiian or other Pacific Islander
Other please specify

What is your Gender?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Male
Female
Transgender
Other
No answer
Less than $25,000
$25,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more

What is your total household income
before taxes during the past 12
months?

What is the highest level of school you
have completed or the highest degree
you have Received?

1. Less than High School
2. High school graduate - high school diploma
or equivalent (for example: GED),
3. Some college but no degree, Associate
degree (for example:
Occupational/vocational program or
Academic program),
4. Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, AB,
BS),
5. Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS,
MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA),
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What is your Home State?

6. Professional School degree (for example:
MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree
(for example: PhD, EdD),
7. Other, please specify
Ak-Wy

How old are you?

Fill in the Blank

Choose which option best describes
your past exposure to The Colbert
Report or other Satirical News
programs

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Frequently
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

Procedure
In order to test my hypotheses, this experimental research design that will rely on
the use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and a student population at The College of
Wooster. MTurk is a “marketplace for work that requires human intelligence” and works
through compensating MTurk users for completing various tasks, which in the case of my
Independent Study would be a survey. MTurk provides the best means to gather a large
and diverse sample in a brief amount of time. The demographics of a small liberal arts
college, like the College of Wooster, are similar to the viewing demographics of The Colbert
Report and should provide sufficient data directly from the audience of TCR.
Survey participants were provided with a link to a Qualtrics survey, and were
subsequently shown a consent form informing them of the direct and indirect benefits of
completing the survey and that they may choose to drop out at any time. Further,
participants were informed that only American users over the age of 18 will be permitted
to partake in the study. If participants agreed to the terms and conditions they were
directed to the survey. First, Participants were asked to complete a short pre-test survey
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that collected data about the previously mentioned control variables in addition to their
partisanship, ideology and self-reported orientation of TCR. After completing the pre-test
survey, participants were asked to view the clip from TCR and were randomly assigned to
view said clip under the previously discussed orientation directives. Following their
viewing of the clip, participants were asked to complete a knowledge test, an evaluation of
how entertaining they found Colbert, and a test to measure their affective polarization.
Finally, participants were debriefed and, for MTurk users, were compensated $0.75 upon
completion of the survey.

Analysis
In order to analyze the collected data, I will be running a difference of means test
across conditions to see the differences in affective polarization based on orientation and
partisanship. Additionally, results from this difference of means test for the treatments
groups will be compared to those from the control group.
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
In this chapter I will first summarize the results from my survey, which measured
how a viewer’s exposure to The Colbert Report under different orientations influences their
affective polarization. Second, I will outline my statistical analysis methods using SPSS and
present my findings. Finally, I will discuss the findings from my analyses and discuss their
implications. Data analysis and discussion will be centered around my research question
and the four hypotheses I developed in my theoretical framework chapter. My first two
hypotheses held that liberal (H1), and more specifically young and liberal (H1a), would be
more likely to orient TCR as news. My second hypothesis posited that conservatives who
viewed the clip under the entertainment orientation would demonstrate higher affective
polarization (H2); while my third hypothesis posited that liberals who viewed the clip
under the information orientation would demonstrate higher affective polarization (H3).
Statistical analysis was done using SPSS. Difference of means tests were conducted to test
my four hypotheses and research question.

Summarization of Data
This section will involve a summarization of my data collection process, and an
overview of the descriptive statistics. Through the MTurk marketplace this research
project was able to recruit 352 MTurk workers who were provided a link to the survey and
were awarded $0.75 upon survey completion. All 352 participants viewed the clip and
completed the survey, but a technical error resulted in 9 participants not filling out the
partisanship and ideology pre-test survey questions.
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Independent Variable
The independent variables in my first hypothesis—age and ideology—were
measured in the pre-test survey. 165 participants identified themselves as being
Moderately-Very Liberal, and 47 fell within the 18-25 age demographic. In total, 28
participants were both between 18-25 and identified as moderately-very liberal. There
were no measurements used to collect info about the independent variable—exposure to
TCR—in the second and third hypotheses. Rather all participants were shown the same clip
at the same point in the survey.

Moderating Variables
The two moderating variables—Orientation of TCR (hereby M1) and
Partisanship/Ideology (hereby M2)—for my second and third hypotheses were
operationalized in two ways. In order to operationalize M1 participants were first asked in
the pre-test survey to provide their self-reported orientation of TCR on a 5-point scale
ranging from strictly news to strictly entertainment (Mean=3.26, SD=0.9). This measure of
orientation was also used to operationalize the dependent variable for the first hypothesis.
M1 was further operationalized through the random assignment of participants to either
one of the two treatment groups, that received the information or entertainment viewing
directive, or to the control group, which received no viewing directive. Randomization of
participants to the pre-test directives were allocated as follows: 107 Entertainment
Directive (30%), 118 Information Directive (34%), and 127 No Directive (36%).
The operationalization of M2 was done through asking participants to self-report
their partisanship (Mean=4.5, SD=1.71) and ideology (Mean=4.49, SD=1.75) in the pre-test
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survey. As mentioned previously, 9 participants were unable to respond to these two
questions, resulting in 343 partisan and ideology answers being collected. For partisanship,
89 participants reported as being Moderate Republican-Strong Republican, 173 reported as
being Moderate Democrat-Strong Democrat, and 81 reported as Independent. For ideology,
splits were similar, with 85 reporting as Moderately-Very Conservative, 165 as ModeratelyVery Liberal, and 93 as moderate.

Dependent Variable
For the first hypothesis, the previously discussed M1 operationalization was used
for the dependent variable—orientation of The Colbert Report (TCR). The dependent
variable—affective polarization—for the second and third hypotheses, was also
operationalized in two ways, scenario response and feeling thermometers, following
participant exposure to TCR. For the scenario responses, participants were asked two
social distance questions related to the impact of partisanship on friendships and
marriages. The two social distance questions were recoded in SPSS into one standard social
distance affective measure (M=2.51, SD=1.02) operationalized from 1-5, with 5
representing a higher affective response. For the feeling thermometers, participants were
asked to rate their feeling towards the actions of President Obama (Mean=61.47, SD=29.4),
the critique from the Fox News host (Mean=29.39, SD=28.59), and the coverage of the
debate by Colbert (Mean=53.94, SD=30.19).
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Hypothesis Testing
In this section, I will conduct analyses to test each of my four hypotheses. Difference
of means tests were conducted to compare my variables across conditions..
H1: Ideologically liberal viewers of satirical news will be more likely than
conservatives to orient The Colbert Report as informative pre-exposure
Using the pre-test measures, I compared the self-reported orientation means between
conservative and liberal ideologies. Prior exposure to SN was also taken into account as an
indicator of familiarity in programs like TCR.
Table 4.1- Liberal Orientation/Exposure
Ideology

N

Mean

SD

Con

89

3.08

1.047

Lib

173

2.86

1.071

Orientation of The

Con

89

3.51

1.067

Colbert Report

Lib

173

3.16

0.83

Exposure to The
Colbert Report

Significance
.109

.004

Results confirmed my hypothesis, and showed that liberals had more exposure and
significantly oriented TCR more towards news than entertainment.
H1a: Ideologically liberal and young (18-25 y/o) viewers will be more likely than
conservatives and older viewers to orient The Colbert Report as informative preexposure
Another difference of means test was conducted to test this hypothesis, but with the
addition of the age measure. The exposure to and orientation of TCR of participants who
qualified as both young (18-25) and liberal were measured against all other participants.
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Table 4.2- Young-Liberal Orientation/Exposure
Young-Liberal

N

Mean

SD

Significance

Exposure to The

Yes

28

2.79

1.031

.227

Colbert Report

No

324

3.03

1.042

Orientation of The

Yes

28

3.00

.76980

Colbert Report

No

324

3.29

.91552

.105

Results confirmed my hypothesis, with young and liberal demonstrating higher levels of
exposure and a higher news orientation compared to all other participants.
H2: Conservatives who view The Colbert Report under entertainment-orientation will
experience increased affective polarization
Utilizing the pre-test ideology, randomly assigned viewing directives, and post-test
affective measures, a comparison of means test was conducted amongst conservative
participants across the pre-test directive conditions.
Table 4.3- Conservative Across Conditions
Condition
Ent

Social Distance
Mean

50.9062

36.0938

32

32

32

32

SD

.98361

28.79990

22.12043

23.67162

Mean

2.5517

34.6207

52.2069

46.7241

29

29

29

29

SD

.91948

24.65681

29.44411

33.28438

Mean

2.7500

44.2857

59.2143

56.8214

28

28

28

28

SD

.73912

36.88406

31.84146

30.00994

Mean

2.5112

37.6966

53.9438

46.0787

89

89

89

89

.90446

30.38406

27.79362

29.98872

N
Total

Colbert

34.7187

N
Control

Fox News

2.2656

N
Info

Obama

N
SD

Conservatives demonstrated unique results across conditions. An independent samples ttest was conducted between the entertainment and information groups, with results
displaying similar affective responses and no significant differences. Significant differences
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were most apparent when comparing responses in the Control group to the Entertainment
group.
Table 4.4- Conservative: Control-Entertainment
Colbert Thermo
Social Distance

Condition

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Ent

32

36.0938

23.67162

Control

28

56.8214

30.00994

Ent

32

2.2656

.98361

Control

28

2.7500

.73912

Significance
.004
.037

For both the Colbert Thermometer measure and the combined Social Distance measure,
Conservative respondents showed significantly higher affective responses under the
Entertainment directive compared to the Control. These results are consistent with my
hypothesis that conservatives would experience higher affective polarization under the
entertainment orientation condition.
H3: Liberals who view The Colbert Report under information-orientation will
experience increased affective polarization
Using the same pre-test measure as the H2 test, another difference of means test was
conducted with only liberal participants across viewing orientation conditions.
Table 4.5- Liberals Across Conditions
Condition
Ent

Social Distance
Mean

16.9800

61.4800

50

50

50

50

1.09549

23.59225

20.01784

25.92709

2.7660

77.3830

16.7660

59.7021

47

47

47

47

SD

.98825

18.84554

21.37981

29.65887

Mean

2.8309

77.8676

17.0147

60.7059

68

68

68

68

1.10835

22.17562

22.09038

29.42081

2.7636

76.7879

16.9333

60.6545

165

165

165

165

Mean
N

N
SD
Total

Colbert

74.7600

SD

Control

Fox News

2.6700

N
Info

Obama

Mean
N
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SD

1.06720

21.64846

21.14962

28.31372

Liberals showed uniform affective responses across conditions, with no condition having
any significantly distinct results. Liberals were expectedly cold towards the critique by Fox
News featured in the clip, but did not show a strong affective response to the social
distance affective measures. A comparison of means test was also conducted across the
pre-test self-reported orientation conditions, with liberals showing almost identical results.
Results were not consistent with my hypothesis. While Liberals showed minor signs
of affective polarization, specifically in their thermometer rating of the Fox News Hosts,
their affective responses were not significantly different under any of the conditions, much
less the information condition. Compared to Conservatives, Liberals showed higher levels
of affective polarization for the social distance measures and the thermometer rating for
the Fox News coverage. The latter result was unsurprising, but the social distance
revelation was not entirely expected. While the Liberal social distance affective measure
(M=2.73, SD=1.05) indicated minor comfortability with the presented scenarios, the
Conservative mean (M=2.51, SD=0.90) was indicated more comfortability with the
difference between the two group means approaching statistical significance (p=0.87).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The goal of this research project is to understand the relationship between
orientation of satirical news and affective polarization. A plethora of research into the
content, presentation, and audiences of satirical news, in addition to research into media
and polarization was consulted to form three hypotheses. These hypotheses were tested
using an experimental research design involving a survey sent out on the Amazon MTurk
marketplace. Participants in the survey were shown the same clip from The Colbert Report
but were randomly assigned to one of three pre-exposure viewing directives that sought to
prime their orientation to the clip. Conservatives who viewed the clip under the
entertainment orientation were expected to show higher affective polarization and liberals
who viewed the clip under the information orientation, were hypothesized to show higher
levels of affective polarization.

Discussion of Results
As hypothesized, liberals, and more so young liberals, had higher levels of exposure
to satirical news and oriented The Colbert Report more towards news than entertainment.
The primary viewing demographics for satirical news programs are younger, more liberal,
people, so these results are unsurprising. Liberals showed intriguing results in my analysis
of their affective response to the TCR clip under the three conditions. Liberals were
expected to show a higher affective response under the information orientation, but ended
up having almost identical affective responses across all three conditions. A potential
explanation for the lack of variety in the liberal participants affective response is that they
had much more prior exposure to TCR and were not influenced by the pre-test directives
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due to their having pre-conceived orientation of the program. If liberals were shown a clip
from a less well known satirical news program, they may be more likely to show a variety
in affective responses. Another possible explanation is that, due to having higher selfreported past exposure to TCR, Liberals were aware of the intention of Colbert’s satire, and
did not experience similar effects to those who saw his satire as more ambiguous, thus
leading to more uniform results.
Wide variation in affective responses was most apparent amongst conservative
participants. Conservatives were expectedly cold towards Obama and warm towards Fox
News, but thermometer ratings nonetheless fluctuated greatly across conditions. The
Entertainment and Information groups demonstrated similar, but not uniform, results
across the affective measures; however, the control group results differed greatly from the
treatment groups. The most apparent variation in affective response was present in the
thermometer rating of Colbert. As previously discussed, the entertainment vs control group
comparison of means test showed significant a difference in the Conservative rating of
Colbert. Under no pre-test directive, conservatives rated Colbert, in addition to Obama and
Fox News, much higher than Conservatives who were given the entertainment or
information pre-test directives.
It is possible that under any pre-test directive, regardless of if it is entertainment or
information, Conservatives had a higher AIME. This higher level of AIME resulted in
Conservatives correctly interpreting Colbert as mocking conservative pundits and thus
resulted in them rating him negatively. Conservatives in the control group had a lower
AIME and viewed Colbert as being a genuine conservative and thus experiences likeminded media effects. The like-minded media effects held true for the conservative control
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group’s response to the social distance measure, which was significantly higher compared
to the entertainment and information groups. These findings partially support my
hypothesis that conservatives with a lower AIME will experience higher affective
polarization, but are also inconsistent because I hypothesized that the entertainment
orientation would lead to AIME amongst conservatives. Conservatives nonetheless
demonstrated higher affective polarization under the entertainment condition in the
thermometer ratings for Obama and Colbert.

Considerations
This research project provides a template future research could rely upon to better
gauge audience responses to satirical news. Future research should create hypotheses
regarding the affective responses of Independents and Moderates. Independents were not
considered because they were not expected to show strong affective responses and did
have direct opposing partisans; however, a sizable portion of my research population selfidentified as independent or moderate. Although they do not possess a direct political
opponent, Independents/Moderates could still provide insightful information of the effects
of exposure to political satire.
Additionally, future research could utilize different forms of political satire to gauge
how responses differ. A plethora of new political satire programs have emerged in the
footsteps of Colbert and Jon Stewart that have yet to be researched in-depth. Satire has
shown to produce a variety of unique responses, therefore by broadening the spectrum of
researched political satire programs we will have a better understanding on the political
implications of satire. Future research could also rely upon different measures of affective
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polarization, such as open-ended responses to prompts or a wider array of social distance
questions.

Implications
Building off past research, this project helped to shed more light on the cognitive
responses to complex satire, causes of affective polarization, and the impact of
partisanship. Colbert’s style of satire proved to be ambiguous based on partisanship of the
viewer, thus resulting in varied interpretations and responses to his messages. SN’s
standing in the media sphere places it on a fine line between news and entertainment, a
factor which allows its viewers to orient the program as they wish. As a result of being able
to be viewed under different orientations, the effects of SN programs are more varied
based upon orientation.
In looking at which SN viewing effects are most influences by partisanship and
orientation, I focused most on affective polarization as it is an extremely influential
contemporary political issue that has been associated with the viewing of political media.
Specifically, partisan media has proven to influence affective polarization; however, when
the partisan bias of a political media source is more ambiguous, ulterior viewing factors
begin to play important roles in the deciphering of these media sources and the responses
they produce. By controlling the pre-exposure orientation of different partisans, I was able
to demonstrate how Colbert’s style of political satire could produce a wide array of
affective responses, especially amongst conservatives.
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Appendix A: Survey
Thank you for your interest in this study! If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read
view a short clip and to answer several questions. All in all, the study should take between 6-7
minutes to complete.
The data collected for the study will be used to write a scholarly paper, which may be published
in an academic journal. There are no risks associated with participation in this research.
You will be paid $0.75 for completing this study. To receive your payment, be sure answer all
survey questions and to copy the validation code you receive at the end of the study and to
submit it in MTurk.
By advancing to the next screen, you consent to participate in the study and you indicate that you
have read and understood the above information.
Q1 How old are you?
________________________________________________________________

Q2 What is your Race?

o White (1)
o Black (2)
o American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
o Asian (4)
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
o Other (6) ________________________________________________
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Q3 What is your gender?

o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Transgender (3)
o Other (4)
o No Answer (5)
Q5 What is your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

o Less Than $25,000 (1)
o $25,000 - $34,999 (2)
o $35,000 - $49,999 (3)
o $50,000 - $74,999 (4)
o $75,000 - $99,999 (5)
o $100,000 - $149,999 (6)
o More than $150,000 (7)
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Q6 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?

o Less than High School (1)
o High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (for example: GED), (2)
o Some college but no degree, Associate degree (for example: Occupational/vocational
program or Academic program), (3)

o Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, AB, BS), (4)
o Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA), (5)
o Professional School degree (for example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree
(for example: PhD, EdD), (6)

Q13 In which state do you currently reside?
▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53)

Q14 Which option best describes your past exposure to The Colbert Report or other satirical
news programs like The Daily Show, or Last Week Tonight?

o Frequently (1)
o Quite Often (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Rarely (4)
o Never (5)
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Q15 Please indicate how your view The Colbert Report in terms of being either a news or
entertainment program.
Strictly
News

Mostly
News

0

Mix of News
Mostly
Strictly
and
EntertainmentEntertainment
Entertainment
1

2

Orientation of The Colbert Report (1)

Q31 Which of the following best describes your partisan identification?

o Strong Republican (1)
o Republican (2)
o Weak Republican (3)
o Independent (4)
o Weak Democrat (5)
o Democrat (6)
o Strong Democrat (7)

3

4

5
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Q32 Which of the following best describes your political ideology?

o Very Conservative (1)
o Conservative (2)
o Moderately Conservative (3)
o Moderate (4)
o Moderately Liberal (5)
o Liberal (6)
o Very Liberal (7)
Directive 1: Please watch this entertaining clip from The Colbert Report, be prepared to
evaluate Colbert’s performance after the clip

Directive 2: Please watch this informative clip from The Colbert Report, be prepared to take a
knowledge test after the clip

Directive 3: Please watch this clip from The Colbert Report

Q17 Where was the Obama vacationing when he asked an ambassador to have a dinner party?

o Key West (1)
o London (2)
o Rome (3)
o Beijing (4)
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Q18 What event does Fox News critique Obama for ignoring while on vacation?

o Tax Bill Vote (1)
o Supreme Court Ruling (2)
o US/Mexico Border Dispute (3)
o International Leader Summit in Europe

(4)

Q20 Please rate how funny you found Stephen Colbert to be

o Very Funny (1)
o Mildly Funny (2)
o Neither Funny or Unfunny (3)
o Not very Funny (4)
o Not Funny at all (5)
Q21 Please rate how entertaining you found the clip to be

o Very Entertaining (1)
o Mildly Entertaining (2)
o Neither Entertaining or Unentertaining (3)
o Not very entertaining (4)
o Not entertaining at all (5)
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Q23 Please respond to the following scenarios

Q24 I would be comfortable with my child or a close family member marrying someone from an
opposing political party

o Strongly agree (1)
o Somewhat agree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat disagree (4)
o Strongly disagree (5)
Q25 When establishing friendships, I take into account the partisanship of potential friends

o Strongly agree (1)
o Somewhat agree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat disagree (4)
o Strongly disagree (5)
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Q26 Please rate your feelings about the following prompts on a 1-100 scale along the
thermometer, with 100 being a strong positive feeling and 0 being a strong negative feeling

Q27 How do you feel about....
0
The actions of President Obama (1)
The critique from the Fox News hosts (2)
The coverage of the debate by Stephen Colbert
(3)

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

